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Financial Markets in the Face of the Apocalypse
Abstract
This paper brings together two strands of the literature:
Quantifying the impact of apocalyptic risk on capital markets,
and the correct computation of the equity risk premium. For
the former, we use events in four countries during the Second
World War to discern markets’ incorporation of information
regarding the probability of an Armageddon for each country.
We then turn to analyzing the impact of a political col-
lapse on the correct computation of the equity risk premium.
Arguing that past computations did not properly account
for the financial implications of political collapse on prop-
erty/civil/human rights, we argue past calculations overstated
the equity risk premium. We provide a correct estimate of the
equity risk premium, demonstrating the important changes in
this estimate over time.
JEL Classification: G12, G15
Keywords: Rare (“black swan”) events; Equity premium;
International political crises; Property, civil and human rights;
World War II
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Financial Markets in the Face of the Apocalypse
1 Introduction
In this paper, we combine two important strands of the literature:
The first entails quantifying the impact of apocalyptic risk on capital markets. The forward-
looking nature of equity and bond financial markets render them particularly suitable to an analysis
of major changing points in human history: To what quantitative degree were financial markets able
to understand and incorporate the cataclysmic changes confronting their national body politics?
We use events during the Second World War to discern markets’ incorporation of information
regarding the probability of an Armageddon for each country.1 We are certainly not the first to
do so. Willard, Guinnane and Rosen (1996) use a time-series analysis “to determine which events
of the U.S. Civil War were viewed as turning points by people at the time” using “asset prices,”
specifically, the “inconvertible currency called the Greenback.” Following on that work, Frey and
Kucher (2001) and Frey and Daniel Waldenström (2004) “analyze the prices of domestic and foreign
government bonds traded before and during World War II.” More recently, Choudhry (2010) studied
the relationship between key World War II events and the Dow Jones Industrial Average. These
studies examine the link between historical events and performance of asset markets.
In the context of these studies, we explore these issues by considering an event study-type
analysis of four national equity and bond markets facing the advent and initial consequences of the
European theater of the Second World War in 1939. The four countries are: France, Poland, Sweden
and the United Kingdom. We chose these countries judiciously. Due to military defeats in Sep.
1939 and June 1940, respectively, two of the countries — Poland and France — suffered collapse
at the beginning of World War II. In reporting simultaneous news stories in these two countries,
we document the differences between our study and the JG study, as well as the differences in the
historical experience across the four countries’ stock- and bond-markets.
The two remaining countries, the United Kingdom and Sweden, subsequently confronted apoc-
alyptic risks but survived with their constitutional structures intact. The United Kingdom faced
an existential threat in the Battle of Britain which followed in the fall of 1940 immediately after
the June 1940 conclusion of the Battle of France. The Kingdom of Sweden faced similar threats
1 It has been suggested the danger of national collapse should be evaluated in terms of cash flows
and risk premiums. We assume these considerations are overwhelmed by the more basic issues
concerning loss of human, civil and property rights.
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during the war.2 Although historians debate the dates when these threats “passed,” their financial
markets reflected the improving prospects of both countries in the succeeding years. We document
these capital markets reactions whilst recognizing the simultaneous news reports.
We believe the true computation of the equity risk premium should be informed by correctly
inferring what it means to earn a return on investment capital (or any asset) in a free-market
economy. The work we seek to address is the oft-quoted work by Jorion and Goetzmann (JG, 1999)
and Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (DMS, 2008 and 2011).
Both previous papers have attempted to compute what DMS denote as the magnitude of the
“equity risk premium historically.” While we take pains to improve the quality of the data we use in
contrast to JG, one issue we address in detail is what Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) characterized as
“temporary” and “permanent” market closures in the continents of Europe and Asia. In seeking to
provide a conservatively-low estimate of the difference between the U. S. and other national markets,
they impute “a 75 percent loss in the month the series permanently disappears” (page 974) to these
market closures. We believe they are inappropriately conservative when they effectively concatenate
returns over “temporary” closures to the resumption of trading when that subsequently occurred:
“For some of these, such as Germany . . . , we are able to trace the fall in value, which we evenly
spread over the time period of the interruption” (page 974).3
Consider three examples of events whose consequences are thus “evenly spread over the period”
of interruption:
1. The effective end of civil rights in Germany’s Weimar Republic with the Feb. 1933 issuance of
the so-called “Reichstag Fire Decree” and the German parliament’s passage of the Enabling
Act in March 1933.
2. The March 1938 “Anschluss” by which the Republic of Austria was incorporated into the
“German Reich.”
3. The June 1940 signing of an armistice between the French Republic and Germany, which
provisions included the surrender of all persons who had been granted political asylum as well
as subsequent loss of civil and human right in France.4
2 By the time the United Kingdom and Sweden faced their existential threats, it was far more
clear what a failure would entail.
3 The works of DMS (2008, 2011), Barro (2005) and Barro and Ursúa (2008) are subject to the
same criticism.
4 In private communication, one economic historian has argued the loss of rights was incurred
by only a portion of the resident French population.
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We claim the computations of Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) were unduly generous in failing to
recognize the above events abrogated not only all property rights within the affected entities, but
also civil and indeed human rights. The nature of the prevailing regime, and the arbitrariness of the
regime’s identification of individuals deprived of rights, render these events over-arching in terms of
their impact on the respective countries’ domestic investors. In free market economies, the point of
financial resources is the implication they bear on purchasing power: In the absence of basic human
and civil rights, there is simply no meaning to the ostensible “purchasing power” of financial (or
real) assets.
The impact is less clear on international investors (in the absence of capital controls), so our
evaluation is a lower bound on the expropriation of such international investors’ assets.5 In the
event of the above WWII cases, ex post international investors domiciled in belligerent nations
(i.e., the Western Allies including United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the United States)
were also expropriated as states of war were sequentially interposed (1939 and 1941) between such
investors and their financial assets.6
In addition, consider the case of the two major successful Communist revolutions of the twenti-
eth century, the 1917 Russian and the 1949 Chinese. Such events overturned the existing financial
regimes and eliminated entirely the property rights of shareholders. In this case, there is no distinc-
tion in the losses of domestic and international investors. We do not believe it would be meaningful
to attempt a “concatenation” of property rights between 1917 and 1995 or between 1949 and 1990.
As a consequence, we should not treat subsequent values in these European domiciles as governed
by a free market, but rather assume there is a total elimination of the value of the equity market.
We believe the same is true in the advent of a successful Communist revolution, á la Russia in 1917
or China in 1949.7
5 In light of our analysis of the implications of the abrogation of civil and human rights, we
believe this is the correct estimate to compute.
6 In addition to the nature of the regime imposed on conquered nations such as Poland and
France in 1939 and 1940, Overy (1994) documents
“German leaders sought to coordinate the industrial resources of the conquered and
dependent areas with the long-term economic interests of the Reich. . . . The state
sought to suppress purely economic motives and to substitute some rough notion of
‘racial political’ priority . . ..”
Separately, Smith (1989) documents the magnitude of “monetary gold stolen by Germany during
World War II” as 320 tons.
7 The Shanghai stock market was closed with the arrival of Imperial Japanese forces Dec. 5, 1941.
Subsequent to V-J Day, trading resumed temporarily in 1946 but terminated three years later. The
city of Shanghai was occupied by Communist forces May 27, 1949. The present Shanghai Stock
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While it is our firm belief the above three cases are “easy” to determine in terms of the impact
on human rights and their implications, our analysis requires a more-subtle distinction between the
above cases and, say, those of Pinochet’s Chile or modern-day regimes in China, Russia and the
Middle East: In these latter cases, while there remains some arbitrariness to the rule of law, it is
reasonably clear to market participants their willingness to abstain from political activities contrary
to the prevailing regime provides adequate cover to engage in commercial activities, including but
not limited to stock-market transactions. In contrast, for our examples cited from the 1930s and 40s,
as well as the original 1917 / 1949 Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and China, no amount of
regime accommodation by certain individuals would assure them the right to commercial activities
or basic human rights.
The importance of respecting human, civil and property rights to all segments of a country’s
domestic population follows from the realization curtailment of such rights to a portion of the
population can be arbitrarily expanded to other segments of society as well as to international
investors. Property rights in a free-market economy are indivisible: Arbitrary abrogation to some
segments of the population can be expanded to all domestic and indeed to international investors
via expropriation, currency controls or wartime measures.
It is for this reason we argue JG’s 25% residual-value assumption is an inappropriate upward-
biased estimate of equity value. We thus recompute the equity risk premium under our zero-residual-
value assumption. We are by no means the sole to make this zero-residual-value assumption: Thus,
Berkman, Jacobsen and Lee (2011) write explicitly, “[I]nvestors in Russian stocks and bonds during
the Revolution of 1917 lost all their money.”
While abrogation of property rights need not always be applied to all investors, relative to
previous papers who have ignored this component, our zero-residual-value is thus an upper bound
(on the impact of violation of the three human, civil and property rights) relative to the lower bound
implicitly obtained by previous authors. Moreover, in lieu of considering individual investors, it has
been suggested the zero-residual-value assumption can also be motivated by a country’s lack of
independence. Specifically, if a country was unable to manage its national wealth, as approximated
by the stock and bond markets, then the value of an asset on which an investor has lost control is
zero or close to it.
With the success of Western-style free-markets over competing economic and political systems
in 1945 and 1991, time-aggregation has diminished the impact of pre-1945 diminution of property,
civil and human rights in the world’s major markets. But such was not the case in the first half of
the 20th century, so we provide a moving-window time-series estimate of the equity risk premium,
as well as its implication for total-value as of 2013. Accordingly, we provide a correct estimate of
Exchange re-opened and began operation Dec. 19, 1990.
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the equity Sharpe Ratio, demonstrating the important changes in this estimate over time.
As an example of another paper which has addressed the issue of political risk, consider Berkman,
Jacobsen and Lee (2011), who
“create a crisis index that shows substantial variation over time. Changes in this crisis
index, our proxy for changes in perceived disaster probability, have a large impact on
both the mean and volatility of world stock market returns. Crisis risk is positively
correlated with the earningsprice ratio and the dividend yield. Cross-sectional tests also
show that crisis risk is priced: Industries that are more crisis risk sensitive yield higher
returns.”
Although the authors concede they “lack long data series for Russian stock markets,” they claim
“several months with missing observations for some European countries around the start of World
War II, and some monthly returns are missing for the German stock market at the end of World
War II.” In seemingly minimizing the lack of data and attributing it to “missing observations,” we
contend their paper, also, has failed to recognize some crises are of an existential threat to their
domestic domiciles.
As have other authors, the exceptional role of the United States in the computation of a global
equity risk premium is also recognized here. The United States has been subject to existential risk
of a global nuclear apocalypse since Soviet detonation of a nuclear device in Aug. 1949, and that
risk was expanded with the Oct. 1964 first nuclear test in the People’s Republic of China. Due
to its unique geographical location, including the relative friendliness of its northern and southern
neighbors, the United States has not since 1814 been at serious risk of an invasion of its continental
territory.8 On the domestic side, there were periods of labor unrest in the United States, a 1919
– 1921 “First Red Scare” when the Socialist Party of America garnered nearly a million votes in
the 1912 and 1920 Presidential elections. That said, the Great Depression was addressed through
existing Constitutional structures, and the Socialist Party dissolved itself in 1972 to form the Social
Democrats, USA. As a consequence of this external security and internal stability, as well as the
size of its capital market, we separate out the impact of U. S. capital markets as we compute a
global equity risk premium.
It is appropriate at this time to lay out the specific assumptions under which our analysis
proceeds: First, computing an equity risk premium should take correct cognizance of the purchasing-
power implication of earning a return on an asset in a free-market economy Moreover, in the absence
8 Even if its resolution had been different, we assume the American Civil War did not threaten
the viability of the northern states.
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of clear substantiation of ownership rights, “concatenating” returns over “temporary” closures to
the resumption of trading when that subsequently occurred is inappropriate. We believe the same
is true in the advent of a successful Communist revolution, á la Russia in 1917 or China in 1949
Finally, there is a distinction between non-democratic regimes which tolerate free markets so long
as individuals abstain from political activities contrary to the prevailing regime. In contrast, for the
examples we cite from the 1930s and 40s, as well as the original 1917 / 1949 Communist regimes
in the Soviet Union and China, no amount of regime accommodation by certain individuals would
assure them the right to commercial activities or basic human rights.
As a result, there is a special role to examining European stock markets in the 1930s. While
analogous analyses should have been conducted in Russia in 1917 and China in 1949, we do not
have access to stock and bond markets in those countries for those periods.
The paper is now structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the data sources we
assembled in support of this research, considering the special difficulties of capturing contemporary
views of current events. Section 3 considers a separate analysis of four countries — Poland, France,
the United Kingdom and Sweden — and their capital markets’ reactions to the existential threat
posed by the approach of the Second World War beginning in March 1938. Section 4 presents the
calculation of the global equity risk premium using our modified methodology. While it has no
bearing on U. S. equity risk-premium estimates, we correct numerical errors in reported values and
present our calculation of that premium as well. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
In order to shed light on the research questions on which we focus, we obtained data from the Global
Financial Data (GFD) database and manually extracted information from microfilms available in
the National Library of France, the National Library of Poland, the Royal Library in Sweden and the
library of the University of Texas at Austin. The GFD database provides historical financial data on
international stock indices. For most of the countries under consideration, U. S. dollar-denominated
benchmarks are available from the early 1920s. Since total-return indices were only available on
a annual frequency, in our study we use monthly capital return indices starting in January 1921.
These indices are built using a uniform methodology. The GFD database pays special attention to
the quality of its time series, and therefore employs a double-blind proprietary research process that
involves only primary sources. The database takes primary source information from government
archives, exchanges, central banks and periodicals of record. Each dataset’s history may come from
varying sources, and sometimes includes more than one primary source. The GFD database uses
a third party to build the dataset with the same source material to confirm that its findings are
accurate. Such an approach provides multiple points of comparison, and any discrepancies are
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researched individually to ensure accuracy.
Similar to Frey and Kutcher (2001), who use capital markets to determine importance of histor-
ical events, one of the key elements of our analysis is our examination of one of the only available
indications of public sentiment in countries that face a existential threat.9 In particular, we would
like to evaluate how that sentiment affects the performance of local stock markets. Taking into
account our aim, we focus only on sentiment proxies which were available at the time of history-
9 One open question is whether the content of these articles measures sentiment or investors’
information sets. While perhaps of some interest, we believe the issue is moot since in either case
we would expect such to be impounded in market prices.
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shaping events.10 For the sake of our study’s aim, we refrain from referring to academic publications
available ex post. In our opinion, such studies are biased by the knowledge of history after the key
events affecting a given country. For the period under consideration, almost none of the modern
commonly-used proxies for market sentiment were available.11 Therefore, we decided to use articles
from leading daily newspapers for information around key events and to use this as a proxy for
public sentiment. For each of four countries, we identify a newspaper with a high circulation
and whenever-possible a centrist political orientation. Together with our native-speaking research
assistants, we selected newspaper articles on the looming German invasion. The topics of the articles
were focused on, but not limited to, the reaction of public opinion, comments on external alliances,
response of the central government, opinion on international policy, including evaluation of German
foreign policy, and news on the strength of the resident armed forces and the modernization of their
hardware. The selected proxy of public sentiment is not free from biases. First, newspapers in the
period around WWII contained difficult-to-measure levels of propaganda. Second, the level and
complexity of information released to the public was much lower in the 1940s than it is now. The
existence of those biases is offset by the fact that at that time the general public had very limited
access to alternative sources of information other than daily newspapers.
In the case of each country, we sought articles in the month around key events by studying
microfilms. Established in 1822, the centre-right Sunday Times, with a circulation approaching a
half million in the mid-1940s, was selected for the United Kingdom. Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzienny
(IKC) was one of the first Polish nationwide daily newspapers published in Cracow between 1910
and 1939. In the 1920s, IKC grew to become Poland’s most popular daily newspaper, with a
readership exceeding 1 million. The paper had a centrist orientation and an average circulation
of 250,000. The sentiment of the French public was measured by articles published in the daily
center-right Le Figaro and the center-left La Croix. By the onset of World War II, Le Figaro had
become France’s leading newspaper. The daily newspaper Göteborgs Handels-och Sjöfartstidning
10 Using Diction software for sentiment analysis, we computed the dispersion in fifteen key met-
rics: Ambivalence, Tenacity Satisfaction, Inspiration, Hardship, Aggression, Accomplishment, Com-
munication, Passivity, Concreteness, Liberation, Denial, Optimism, Certainty and Realism – the
within-category average dispersion and the cross-category average dispersion. The two categories
are { United Kingdom, Sweden } and { France, Poland }. Interestingly, along the above fifteen
items, in all except one category, the within-category dispersion is smaller than the cross-category
dispersion, indicating greater within-, rather than without-, category commonality. See Tetlock
(2007).
11 Please compare to/with sentiment indices prepared by Jeffrey Wurgler
(http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/) and the American Association of Individual
Investors (http://www.aaii.com/).
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(GHT) was a key title in Sweden in the 1940s, and we examined articles published in it.
3 Europe, Post-1938
3.1 Existential Threats in Interwar Europe, 1918 – 1939, and World
War II
The interwar period in Europe covers the period between the Armistice that ended the First World
War on Nov. 11, 1918 and the hostilities that began the Second in Europe on Sep. 1, 1939. In our
analysis, we consider the stock and bond markets of four countries in that period: Poland, France,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. During this period, these four countries faced existential threats,
which we define as threats to their existence and viability as a modern country, and threats that
place at risk their populations’ civil rights.12 As is well known, two of these countries succumbed
to their threats, whereas two were able to maintain a continuity of their institutions, markets and
civil rights.
In presenting these empirical results, our analysis should be contrasted with JG’s Figure 2,
entitled “Real stock prices before interruption.” (see page 969). Whereas theirs is a summary across
all nations, our approach is country-specific and thus delineates the differences across disparate
national markets, including both markets that succumbed as well as survived their existential threats
To understand the nature of stock and bond markets during this period, we consider certain
critical events:13
12 We recognize that in 1939, the nature of democracy and of civil rights in these four countries
was not uniform. See McMillian (1985), Wieczorkiewicz (1991), Leczyk (2006), Neville (1995),
Sejersted (2011) and Clarke(2011).
13 Certain events were of specific importance to the Kingdom of Sweden, and we consequently
relegate their detailing in the subsection dealing with Sweden.
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Table 1: Critical Events, Europe, 1938 – 1941
Date Event Significance
March 12, 1938 Austrian Anschluss Incorporation of Austria into Nazi Germany; first vio-
lation of World War I’s Treaty of Versailles beyond Ger-
many’s borders
Sep. 30, 1938 Munich Accord Agreement by United Kingdom and France, imposed
on Czechoslovakia, permitting German annexation of
Sudetenland
March 31, 1939 United Kingdom and
France extend guarantee
to Poland
Germany extends its reach beyond German-speaking
lands: Following German dismemberment of residual
Czechoslovakia, United Kingdom and France guarantee
Polish independence
Generally regarded as the end date of British / French
policy of “appeasement”
April 28, 1939 Abrogation of German-
Polish Non-Aggression
Pact
Pact unilaterally abrogated by Germany; Increased like-
lihood of general hostilities in Europe
Sep. 3, 1939 United Kingdom and
France declare war on
Germany
Following German invasion of Poland Sep. 1. Beginning
of World War II in Europe
June 22, 1940 French Armistice “Battle of France” concludes with German victory; end
of Third French Republic
July 7, 1940 Beginning of the “Battle of
Britain”
Air offensive of the German air force against the United
Kingdom, seen as preparatory for a German invasion of
the home islands.
The end date for the “Battle of Britain” is typically
taken to be Oct. 31, 1940.
June 22, 1941 German invasion of the So-
viet Union
Entrance of Soviet Union into war ends status of United
Kingdom as sole European belligerent of Germany and
Italy
Dec. 7, 1941 Japanese attack on Naval
Air Station Pearl Harbor
and other Hawaiian mili-
tary facilities
Entrance of the United States as belligerent in World
War II
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3.2 The Role of the U. S. Dollar — Convertibility from Local Currency
As we consider the stock and bond markets’ evaluations of important events, including existentially-
threatening ones, it is appropriate to address the issue of numeraire, which we take as the local
currency adjusted for the rate of change in its exchange with the U. S. dollar. We are explicitly
making two critical assumptions:
1. At perhaps non-negligible cost, it was possible for investors in the various European countries
to acquire U. S. dollars and use them as a store of purchasing power.
The import of this assumption is to relegate importance to the local-currency values of the
stock and bond markets, adjusted for their exchange-rate value to the U. S. dollar, and to
embody them with purchasing-power. Thus, unless otherwise noted, all results are those
adjusted for changes in the exchange rate.
This may be contrasted with, say, the value of the U. S. stock market in Oct. 1962. The
relatively-moderate decline in the U. S. market at the time — its greatest decline from crisis
onset to resolution was a modest −4.7% — may be attributable to a range of factors, but one
of them is the lack of a liquid alternative “riskfree” investment.
2. The U. S. dollar represented the riskless asset at the time.
The culmination of these two assumptions is to render meaning and significance to the value of
stocks and bonds.
3.3 Republic of Poland, to Sep. 1, 1939
With its location at the intersection of central and eastern Europe, Poland has borne the consequent
destiny of geography, dating back to the first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian confederacy in 1772.
Whereas historians parse the number of partitions to which Polish territory has been subjected, the
Second World War caused its dissolution in 1939 and resulted in extreme hardship to its population.
Although its invasion was the reason the United Kingdom and France declared war in 1939, it may
be said Poland did not resume true independence and national sovereignty until the establishment
of a non-communist Republic of Poland in 1989.
Table 1 has already laid out the events preceding Sep. 1, 1939. In attempting to understand the
market consequences of these events, we surveyed a contemporary national publication in Poland.
The thrust of this effort was to determine whether the ex-post results of the German and consequent
Sep. 17 Soviet invasions were fully or partially anticipated by market participants. Such an effort is
particularly challenging, as in circumstances such as those prevailing in Aug. 1939, some national
11
authorities may engage in hype, disinformation or “propaganda” whose purpose is to bolster the
“national spirit.”
Table 2 summarizes headlines and titles of main articles published by Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzi-
enny (IKC) (“Illustrated Daily Courier”) around key events. The newspaper at the time had the
highest circulation among all newspapers available prior to World War II.
Table 2: Headlines of Newspapers Around Crucial Events for Polish Capital Market
The table summarises headlines and titles of main articles published by Ilustrowany
Kuryer Codzienny (IKC) around key event for existence of state and capital mar-
ket. The newspaper had the highest circulation among all newspapers available






The Munich Agreement was a settlement permitting Nazi Germany’s annexation of Czechoslovakia’s
areas along the country’s borders mainly inhabited by German speakers, for which a new territorial
designation ”Sudetenland” was coined.
1) “Historical moments in Muenchen Palace-War was prevented”, IKC, 10/02/1938
2) “Does Europe have still chance for Demobilization? -economic perspectives on world after
Munich conference”, IKC, 10/02/1938
3) “World peace maybe was saved-but future of Czechoslovakia still unclear”, IKC, 10/07/1938
4) “Idyll of great four is gone- new fortification in West announced by Hitler”, IKC, 10/11/1938




German request for the incorporation of the Free City of Danzig and an extra-territorial highway
through the Polish territory.
1) “Poland will stand on guard of independence, unification and honour”, IKC, 11/01/1938
2) “Great show of Polish aerospace industry-new fighter, mid-range bomber and dive bomber”,
IKC, 11/06/1938
3) “What will be next after Sudetenland?-next phase of German expansion”, IKC, 11/07/1938
4) “Does United Kingdom satisfy German hunger from other plates? - shortage of commodities in
Europe”, IKC, 11/19/1938




United Kingdom and France pledged the support of itself and France to guarantee Polish indepen-
dence after German invasion of Czechoslovakia.
1) “British military guarantees of Polish boarders” , IKC, 04/01/1939
2) “Why Germany won’t win a world war?”, IKC, 04/01/1939
Continued on next page
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The pact was unilaterally abrogated by Germany.
1) “Hitler has followed in steps of his predecessors Wilhelm II and Stresemann- such(his)
policy leads to the same known outcome”, IKC, 04/30/1939
2) “Italian government expressed deep concern on German renouncement of Non-Aggression
Pact(with Poland)” IKC, 04/30/1939
3) “United Kingdom (Polish ally) calmly take a command of fight for freedom -Sir Simone”, IKC,
04/30/1939
4) “Today 100 airplanes over Cracow -parade of mighty Polish air force”, IKC, 05/01/1939
5) “Germany needs to show respect to world peace, Poland won’t be separated from Baltic sea




Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, initiating World War II.
1) “German newspapers on inevitability of Polish air strike on Berlin”, IKC, 06/20/1939
2) “Hitler will finish of German nation for years to come”, IKC, 08/18/1939
3) “Overwhelming military superiority of Peace Bloc over Axis countries”, IKC, 08/19/1939
4) “1:14 and 1:5 there is no way that they (Axis countries) can win it”, IKC, 09/01/1939
As Table 2 evidences, the Polish newspaper IKC reported the events leading to the Sep. 1
outbreak of hostilities. At the time of the Sep. 1938 Munich Accord, the newspaper seemed to
share the “peace for our time” sentiment expressed by some statesmen. Less than a month later,
the first demands were pressed upon Polish authorities with respect to Poland’s sole access to
the Baltic Sea, the Danzig Corridor, established after World War I. From there, in fairly rapid
succession follow the March 15, 1939 disintegration of the remaining Czechoslovakia, the March
31, 1939 pledge of support to Poland by the British and French Western allies, the April 28, 1939
unilateral abrogation of the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact and the Sep. 1, 1939 invasion of
Poland. It may be noted Aug. 1939 headlines are relatively bullish regarding immediate Polish and
allied military prospects.
Figure 1 below presents price indices for the Polish stock market (in USD and inflation-adjusted
terms) as well as for Polish bonds issued in the local currency (5%) and the U. S. Dollar (4%) over
the period Feb. 1938 – Aug. 1939. As is to be expected across all stock and bond markets, equities
represent a more-risky and hence higher-volatility asset.
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Figure 1: The figure displays performance of Polish stock and bond market during the period
between February 1938 and August 1939. In addition the performance of Polish bonds held by local
and foreign investors is shown. The dashed area corresponds to periods crucial for continuation of
Polish stock and bond market. The areas are numerated as follows (on top): 1- British Guarantee
to Poland, 2- Abrogation of German Polish Non-Aggression Pact, 3- Britain and France declared
war on Germany after attack on Poland. On bottom of the figure the key events for WW2 period
are highlighted: 1- Annexation of Austria, 2- Munich Accord and German demands on Poland.
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Based on month-end data, Polish stock and bond markets peaked in Feb. 1939, some 15 days
before the critical March 1939 events, and then begin a secular decline, accelerating as the abrogation
of the Non-Aggression Pact led to eventual hostilities. From the Feb. 1939 peak to end-of-markets
Aug. 1939, stock prices declined 23.2%, whereas in the bond markets the 5%-coupon and 4%-coupon
dollar-denominated bonds declined 11.8% and 21.3% respectively.
3.4 French Republic, to June 22, 1940
Since the end of World War I in Nov. 1918, the French Republic struggled to regain its pre-war
economic, political and military balance. With substantial military actions having taken place on
its home soil, France had suffered grievously during that war, and was severely buffeted by political
and economic winds during the interwar period. Many military experts, perhaps with the hindsight
of history, have attributed a lack of coherent national will, passivity and defeatism (as exemplified
by the Maginot Line’s fixed fortifications) to their unsuccessful attempt to withstand the initial
onslaught of World War II in Western Europe. In the event, while France declared war in Sep.
1939, it undertook no significant offensive military operations during the “phony war” period, and
together with its British ally was only able to hold out militarily from May 10 to June 22, 1940,
before conceding defeat and suing for an armistice.
Table 3 summarizes headlines and titles of main articles published by Le Figaro and La Croix.
Le Figaro was (and is) one of the French newspapers with the widest circulation.
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Table 3: The headlines of newspapers around event crucial for survival of French capital market
The table summarise headlines and titles of main articles published by Le
Figaro(LF) and La Croix(LC) around key event for existence of state and
capital market. The Le Figaro was one of the largest-selling French news-






The Munich Agreement was a settlement permitting Nazi Germany’s annexation of Czechoslo-
vakia’s areas along the country’s borders mainly inhabited by German speakers, for which a new
territorial designation ”Sudetenland” was coined.
1) “The calm of French people is to be admired -the Italian press acknowledged”, LF, 26/09/1938
2) “London’s decisions are to be taken only with Paris’ agreement”, LF, 26/09/1938
3) “In case of German aggression, France, Great Britain and the USSR would defend Czechoslo-
vakia”, LF, 27/09/1938
4) “Defensive measures are being taken in France: Passive defense, All the aviation factories will
work on Saturday and Facilities will be provided to mobilized debtors”, LF, 30/09/1938
5) “The Council of Ministers congratulates M. Daladier unanimously”, LF, 01/10/1938
6) “M. EDOUARD DALADIER has rekindled the flame while a huge crowd struck up the French
hymn Marseillaise”, LF, 03/10/1938




United Kingdom and France pledged the support of itself and France to guarantee Polish indepen-
dence after German invasion of Czechoslovakia.
1) “FRANCE WANTS PEACE AND FREEDOM FOR ALL CITIZENS but any kind of vi-
olence against it WOULD BE BROKEN UP declared M. Edouard Daladier”, LF, 30/03/1939
2) “M. Chamberlain’s speech reflects the desire of Paris and London to confront force with force”,
LF, 31/03/1939
3) “Moscow shows a defiant attitude toward Paris and London”, LF, 03/04/1939
09/03/1939
Britain & France
declare war on Germany
Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, initiating World War II.
1) “Cellars and attics converted into shelters to face air attacks” LF, 28/08/1939
2) “In Paris, Drastic measures are taken to ensure the safety of the civilians” LF, 30/08/1939
3) “The Italian public opinion is impressed by the serenity and energy demonstrated by the French.”
LF, 30/08/1939
4) “The French and British naval supremacy... makes no doubt for the American insurance
companies” LF, 01/09/1939
5) “The state of siege proclaimed in France and Algeria” LF, 02/09/1939
6) “The parliament voted unanimously for funds allocated to national defense” LF, 03/09/1939
7) “ General mobilization continues calmly in the whole French empire” LF, 05/09/1939
Continued on next page
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German victory in the Battle of France led to French capitulation.
1) “Marshal Ptain, president of the Council, gave a speech to the country ”, LC, 18/06/1940
2) “The stirring address of Marshal Petain ”, LC, 21/06/1940
3) “Plenipotentiaries have received the terms of the Armistice” (Some articles are censored), LC,
22/06/1940
4) “The armistice between France and Germany has been signed”, LC, 24/06/1940
5) “Marshal Petain to be trusted”, LC, 24/06/1940
6) “Our country’s pride remains spotless-Marshal Petain declared”, LC, 25/06/1940
7) “Day of national mourning - Hostilities with Germany and Italy have ceased on Monday night at
0:35 AM”, LC, 26/06/1940
8) “We have to restore the image of France by showing its exemplary calm, its hard work and its
dignity” Marshal Petain declared”, LC, 27/06/1940.
The stories in the French newspapers constitute a mixture of hope, defiance and confidence. It
is not until the Armistice has been negotiated that there is talk of “national mourning” coincident
with the pronouncements of the post-Armistice French government.
French stock and bond markets provide an interesting insight into the prevailing views of those
capital markets. Figure 2 below presents price indices for the French stock market (in USD and
inflation-adjusted terms) as well as the 3% French consol bond over the period Feb. 1938 – June
1940.
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Figure 2: The figure displays performance of French stock and bond market during the period
between February 1938 and August 1940. The dashed area corresponds to periods crucial for
continuation of local stock and bond market. The areas are numerated as follow (on top): 1-
Munich Accord, 2- British and French Guarantee to Poland, 3- Britain and France declared war
on Germany 4- German victory in Battle of France. On bottom of the figure the key events for
WW2 period are highlighted: 1- Annexation of Austria, 2-Beginning of war between the Soviet
Union and Germany, 3- United States entered the War, 4- German setbacks at Stalingrad and El
Alamein/German force entered Southern France, 5-Germany’s first major defeat- Stalingrad, 6- D
Day: The Allied invasion of France, 7-Germany surrenders to the allies.
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Considering USD-adjusted returns, the French stock market shared brief relief rallies in the
aftermath of the Austrian Anchluss acquiescence (14% rise; the 3% consol bond simultaneously
posted a 7% return) and post-Munich euphoria. As further events unfolded, a 26% decline was
posted with the outbreak of World War II (the bond declined 11.5%), followed by a “recovery”
presumably attributable to the initially-docile “phony war” on the Western Front. Finally, a 22.4%
decline (the bond fell 5.6%) was posted from the end of April through the end of May 1940, at
which time trading ceased, not to resume until March 1941.
Two comments are appropriate here: First, although their magnitudes are significant, the stock
and bond declines from April through May do not reflect the calamitous events of June 1940: As
is well-known, Germany began the second phase of its Western Front Blitzkrieg June 5th, and the
city of Paris surrendered on the 14th. The month itself concluded with the end of the Third French
Republic upon the June 22, 1940 Armistice.
Second, the French stock and bond markets resumed trading in March of 1941. As we argued
in the Introduction and will specify in greater detail in Section 3, we posit a lack of continuity,
consistency and indeed identity between trading during the Third French Republic and trading
under the Armistice-Vichi institutional structure: The latter represent a total lack of civil and
human rights, rendering the “value / purchasing-power” of money meaningless.
3.5 Kingdom of Sweden, 1938 – 1945
Sweden, much like the Swiss Confederation in both world wars and The Netherlands in the first,
was the mirror-image of Poland in being a beneficiary of its geography. Located at the periphery of
Continental Europe, it was absolved from post-Napoleonic military entanglement and permitted a
neutrality it did not always scrupulously observe. One inadvertent but critical benefit accrued from
the 1905 dissolution of its union with the Kingdom of Norway: As a consequence, Norway was a
separate entity in World War II not linked to Sweden through a mutual-defense treaty, and so an
attack on Norway did not automatically constitute an attack on Sweden.
To the east of Sweden lies the Republic of Finland, which during World War II found itself in
hostilities twice against the Soviet Union (the Winter and Continuation Wars) and then against
Germany. From these, too, Sweden was exempt. The traditional explanation for Sweden’s conduct
during the Second World War has been summarized by the term “small-state realism,” a refer-
ence to realpolitik accommodation seemingly required of a small state during times of global-power
hostilities. See Östling (2001) for a discussion.
Table 4 summarizes headlines and titles of main articles published by Goetborgs Handels-och
Sjoefartstidning (GHT) newspaper around key events for Sweden during this time period. GHT
was a key daily newspaper published until 1973.
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Table 4: The Headlines of Newspapers Around Events Crucial for Survival of Swedish Capital Market
The table summarise headlines and titles of main articles published by Goetborgs
Handels-och Sjoefartstidning (GHT) newspaper around key events for existence of state
and capital market. The Goetborgs Handels-och Sjoefartstidning was a key daily newspa-







The conflict known as Winter war occurred between 30 November 1939 and 13 March 1940. The
war was concluded with Moscow Peace Treaty. Finland ceded 11% of its pre-war territory and 30%
of its economic assets to the Soviet Union.
1) “The entire Nordic Region in anguished tension”, GHT, 11/29/1939
2) “In the danger zone” An article on how close to Sweden may be and what we need to do in terms
of rearming. GHT, 11/29/1939
3) “State Department sends ships to Finland to pick up Swedish citizen”, GHT, 11/30/1939
4) “Mobilization in Sweden ’not yet imminent”, GHT, 11/30/1939
5) “Sweden looks after Finnish interests in Moscow”, GHT, 12/01/1939
6) “Do not spread rumours cause for concern!”, GHT, 12/01/1939
7) “Prime Minister assures sympathy for Finland - Despite all the difficulties the neutrality politics
be pursued”, GHT, 12/02/1939
8) “Crowds in Stockholm tributes Finland - Singing and cheering outside the legation”, GHT,
12/02/1939





The conflict occurred between 9 April and 10 June 1940. As result of it Norway became occupied
by German forces.
1) “The battle in Norway is stated - it is passed on outside the country”, GHT, 06/10/1940
2) “Norway puts down its arms”, GHT, 06/10/1940
3) “One day, the free Norwegian flag will be hoisted again - proclamations by the Norwegian




The official agreements on the Permittenttrafiken between Germany and Sweden are signed.
1) “German military on Swedish railways to Norway - Transit has been granted ’after the
end of hostilities’”, GHT, 07/06/1940
2) “English shrug to Sweden - but the foreign office has the transit in memory”, GHT, 07/06/1940
3) “Sweden pretends neutrality which has ceased to have meaning. Sharp English criticism of
Swedish government line”, GHT, 07/10/1940
Continued on next page
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Germans asked Sweden to allow the transportation of armed German troops. The Swedish
government granted this permission.
1) “Freedom of the press is essential if democracy is to prevail”, GHT, 06/19/1941
2) “About the Swedish policy of neutrality” The article suggests that the government believes in a
German victory and responds accordingly. GHT, 06/23/1941
3) “No source of concern for the weekend, other than within politics” - describes Swedes as happy
celebrating midsummer in the sunshine and though they are well aware of the war, they’re not that
bothered, GHT, 06/23/1941
4) “Sweden allows the transit of German troops through Nordland”, GHT, 06/26/1941
5) “Leniency towards Germany gives birth to new demands - Increasingly difficult for Sweden to
maintain their neutrality”, GHT, 06/28/1941
6) “Before it is too late,” whether Sweden will continue to give in, or if we are able to continue to
keep neutrality, GHT, 06/30/1941
06/25/1941
Continuation War
The beginning of continuation war, between the Soviet Union and Finland.
1) “State uncertain, especially in Finland and Rumania- suspense / anxiety in Sweden” ,
GHT, 06/21/1941
2) “The fire spreads: now that Finland is with Germany” , GHT, 06/23/1941
3) “The stock exchange”: The stock market has not been the same since 10th June due to the
Germany-Russia tension, GHT, 06/23/1941
4) “Swedish armour weapon in strong development”, GHT, 06/27/1941
5) “Even narrower”: The German-Russian War has led to a worsening of Sweden’s economic
freedom. The space for the Swedish foreign trade has become even tighter , GHT, 06/28/1941
6) ”The stock exchange”: The German-Russian War has not brought about a profound reversal of




In Sweden it is believed that Germany regards a pre-emptive occupation of Sweden as necessary, to
prevent Sweden from cooperating with an Allied landing in Norway.
1) “German aircrafts on the coast of Sk̊ane” , GHT, 02/09/1942,
2) “War Organization of the workforce should be prepared now - Industry Commission currently
against new aerospace industry”, GHT, 02/21/1942,
3) “Our aerospace industry inspires high hopes - Minister for Defence speech in Gothenburg.
Boldness and imagination required” It’s about how important it is that we have a strong defence
both in the air, on land and on the water. GHT, 02/21/1942
4) “Our country will never itself take the initiative in war, but it will defend itself to the utmost if
attacked”, GHT, 02/24/1942
5) ”We need powerful armoured troops - Current defence problems on the Stockholm Congress” ,
GHT, 03/24/1942
6) ”Fanatical information in English newspaper about Sweden (incoming German invasion) - But
the official London knows nothing.”, GHT, 03/24/1942
Continued on next page
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The end of German-
Swedish transition-
agreement
Sweden notifies Germany that the transition-agreement will be cancelled on 15 August.
1) “Crisis in Sweden, believes British correspondent - permittent traffic [not sure how to
translate that but it’s about German soldiers on furlough/leave] is again ’on the wall’”, GHT,
07/31/1943
2) “Sweden decides to cancel the permittent traffic - Certain information in English press”, GHT,
08/03/1943
3) “Transit consent and the war in Norway”- an article based on a book (”The Swedish people
wonder” by Bertil St̊alhane) , GHT, 08/04/1943
4) “London: The permittent traffic suspension is notified Berlin bluntly - The Swedish decision
shows how the hearts of millions are liberated from the fear of Germany” , GHT, 08/05/1943
5) “Permittent traffic stops as well as military transports - consensus between Swedish and German
governments about decommissioning during August”, GHT, 08/06/1943
6) “Sweden acted very late - the decision is no surprise to London”, GHT, 08/06/1943,
7) “No masked permittent-journeys - German civilians may go through Sweden, but only after
visa”, GHT, 08/20/1943
Media coverage in Sweden followed the Nordic foci of World War II: The Finnish-Soviet Winter
War of Nov. 30, 1939 – March 13, 1940 and the German conquest of Norway April – June 1940. After
the Norwegian surrender, Swedish acquiescence for the transit of “unarmed” soldiers through its
territory became public knowledge (July 1940), notwithstanding this implicit violation of neutrality.
In the midst of 1941 Sweden found itself in a “German sea,” surrounded by Germany in Denmark,
Norway and Poland and by German ally Finland.
In June 1941, at the beginning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Sweden was asked to
provide transit through its territory to a German infantry division and its associated matériel. This
clearly-flagrant violation of neutrality has since been described as a potentially existential threat
if Sweden had refused: The term is the “Midsummer Crisis” with ostensible conflicts between
various components of the Swedish government and the then-reigning monarch. Historians today
debate whether or not there truly was a crisis — in the sense that acquiescence would inevitably
be forthcoming — or whether the events were subsequently described as such to shield or attack
various Swedish personalities. Simultaneously, the Finnish-Soviet Continuation War began on June
25, 1941. Press coverage follows these elements without explicitly alluding to an existential threat.
Finally, as allied military fortunes continued to improve, the Swedish Government notified Germany
of the termination of the transit agreement on July 15, 1943.
Figure 3 below presents price indices for the Swedish stock market (in USD and inflation-adjusted
terms) as well as the 3% Swedish consol bond over the period Feb. 1938 – Aug. 1945.
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Figure 3: The figure displays performance of Swedish stock and bond market during the period
between February 1938 and August 1945. The dashed area corresponds to periods crucial for
continuation of local stock and bond market. The areas are numerated as follow(on top): 1- Soviet-
Finnish war, 2- Norwegian campaign and German victory, 3- Midsummer crisis on transit of German
war materials/beginning of war between the Soviet Union and Germany supported by Finland, 4-
February crisis of 1942 and mobilisation , 5- Cancelation of transition-agreement. On bottom of
the figure the key events for WW2 period are highlighted:1- Annexation of Austria, 2- Munich
Accord, 3- Invasion of Poland by Germany, 4- German victory in of Battle of France, 5- United
States entered the War, 6- German setbacks at Stalingrad and El Alamein, 7-Germany’s first major
defeat- Stalingrad, 8- D Day: The Allied invasion of France, 9-Germany surrenders to the allies.
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Beyond the 1939 outbreak of World War II in Europe, there are several dates which could be
considered “existential” for the Swedish state and capital markets:
1. The Winter War of 1939 – 1940
2. The Norwegian campaign of 1940
3. The “Midsummer Crisis” of 1941
To its benefit, Sweden was able to maintain its integrity, independence and civil rights throughout
the War period.
The nearly-coincident nature of the Winter War and Norwegian campaign did have a significant
impact on Swedish capital markets: The stock market reached a trough on April 30, 1940, after the
beginning of hostilities in Norway, with a decline of 36.3% from its Feb. 1938 reading. Interestingly,
and in contrast to other countries, the concurrent bond market’s decline was greater: 46%.
Given the nature and controversial interpretation of the Midsummer Crisis, it would be of
interest to determine the Swedish stock and bond markets’ reactions to that Crisis. This latter
is however confounded by the monthly granularity of our data and the apparent short, intra-June
1941 nature of that crisis. In the event, the change in stock-market value between May and July
1941 is a 5.6% increase, which may in part be a relief rally. We find no evidence capital markets
reflected significant concern regarding this event.
The survival of Sweden through World War II permits us to explore the exit of Swedish capital
markets from the conclusion of hostilities in May 1945: After the above-noted 36.3% decline, the
equity market rose 76%, to end 12.2% above its Feb. 1938 value. Another interesting result pertains
to the bond market. Although its value never returned to par (by May 1945), its price leveled off
by Aug. 1941 at a value 28% below its Feb. 1938 value, increasing an additional 7.6% at the end of
March 1945. We take the level value as one indication of a return to a possibly-new “normalcy” at
a higher level of interest rates than in 1938: If such be the case, it is interesting this happened as
early as Aug. 1941.
3.6 The United Kingdom, 1938 – 1945
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the United Kingdom and its Common-
wealth and Empire were the sole Western belligerents against Germany from the fall of France on
June 22, 1940 until the German invasion of the Soviet Union exactly one year later. Dating back
to the previous prime minister, in 1937 the British military Chiefs of Staff had warned its political
leadership of the need to avoid the severe pitfalls of being sole combatant against an array of hostile
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adversaries. And yet, that is precisely the situation in which the United Kingdom found itself at
the end of the Battle of France.
Since, in the final analysis, the United Kingdom was one of the Big Three to prevail in World
War II, both media reports as well as capital-market reactions provide insights into the situation
as perceived by some of the players during this period. Table 5 below presents headlines and titles
of main articles in the Sunday Times (ST), then and now one of the primary British news outlets.
Table 5: The Headlines of Newspapers Around Events Crucial for Survival of British Capital Market
The table summarise headlines and titles of main articles published by
Sunday Times (ST) around key event for existence of state and capital
market. The Sunday Times was one of the largest-selling British national






The Munich Agreement was a settlement permitting Nazi Germany’s annexation of Czechoslovakia’s
areas along the country’s borders mainly inhabited by German speakers, for which a new territorial
designation ”Sudetenland” was coined.
1) “Markets Governed by Politics”, ST, 09/25/1938
2) “Money Market: Active demand for dollars; larger turnover of gold; discount rates
higher”,ST,09/25/1938
3) “Italy and Germany United Against Democracies”, ST, 09/25/1938
4) “Mussolini the Peace Maker”, ST, 10/02/1938
5) “The Peace-and After: Outlook for European Settlement”, ST, 10/02/1938
6) “How London Would Have Been Evacuated”, ST, 10/02/1938
7) “The Outlook”: The great relief that peace has been preserved has the amplest justification, and




United Kingdom and France pledged the support of itself and France to guarantee Polish indepen-
dence after German invasion of Czechoslovakia.
1) “The Outlook: Right to expect a gradual further growth of Stock Exchange business. For
the moment, particular groups of securities are likely to be singled out for attention-possibly iron
and steel shares”, ST, 03/12/1938
2) ”Shock to Market Confidence: Immediate Outlook Dependent upon Politics”- Disturbing events
arose with SE; only small pressure to sell in last few days, ST, 03/19/1938
09/03/1939
Britain & France
declare war on Germany
Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, initiating World War II.
1) “While Parliament was passing the Emergency Powers (Deference) Act, the city was mak-
ing its own preparations between peace and war”, ST, 08/27/1939
2) “Parliament and The Crisis: All Parties Support the Government, ST, 08/27/1939
3) “1914 vs. 1939, Hitler & Stalin”, ST, 08/27/1939
4) “Patriotism is the soul of a nation” , ST, 08/27/1939
5) “Britain’s Food Reserves Greater Than Ever”, ST, 08/27/1939
6) “The City Prepares For War: How Supply of Credit is Maintained” -The City and the country
is in far better economic shape than in August 1914, and our economic strength will become more
and more apparent with the passage of time.” ST, 09/03/1939
Continued on next page
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German victory in the Battle of France led to French capitulation.
1) “Armistice Terms Signed: Fight Goes on Until Peace is Reached with Italy”, ST, 06/23/1940
2) “Keitel’s Tribute to French; The Fall of France: Will Resistance Go On?”, ST, 06/23/1940
3) “How France Heard of Peace Move: People’s Fortitude in Face of Defeat”-France collapsed
because of military and political reasons; England not the same”, ST, 06/23/1940
4) “Pros and Cons of Invasion”-The enemy will rely on fear, will attempt a blockade, and there will
be an unknown political factor involved”, ST, 06/23/1940
5) “Still Hope for the French Empire: Qualified Acceptance of the Armistice” -”If France goes on




Offensive of German Air Force against the United Kingdom started in the summer of 1940.
1) “Germans Admit RAF Successes”, ST, 07/07/1940
2) “If Britain is Invaded”, ST, 07/07/1940
3) “Some Problems of the Financial Front-”All war losses should be shared by the whole commu-
nity”, ST, 07/07/1940
4) “All In the Front Line Now: Are We Ready in Heart and Soul?”, ST, 07/07/1940
5) “The Strategical Conditions of Invasion”-Possibility is there, but there will be much delay;




The launch of German invasion of the Soviet Union
1) “Axis Funds in US Frozen”, ST, 06/14/1941
2) “The War’s Ebb and Flow: Undercurrents in Our Favor”, ST, 06/14/1941
3) “The Spirit of the People”, ST, 06/14/1941
4) “The War’s Ebb and Flow: Undercurrents in Our Favor”, ST, 06/14/1941
5) “Stream of Planes Over Atlantic: Astonishing Achievement of Ferry Pilots”, ST, 06/22/1941
6) “The United States Preparing For War”, ST, 06/22/1941
7) “Should Britain Increase Supplies?”, ST, 06/22/1941
8) “Blow at Heart of Russia: Hitler’s Aim in Moscow Drive”, ST, 06/22/1941
9) “Smashing Invasion Plan and Aiding Russia”, ST, 06/22/1941
10) “Hitler as Napoleon”, ST, 06/22/1941
12/07/1941
Japanese attack on
US navy base in Pearl
Harbor
As result of the attack United States declared war on Japan.
1) “The Seesaw in Russia and Libya: German Army’s First Major Defeat”, ST, 12/07/1941
2) “What Japan Wants”, ST, 12/07/1941
3) “War Must be Won In Germany”, ST, 12/07/1941
4) “The United States: Preparing Huge Victory Production Plan”, ST, 12/07/1941
5) “Driving Enemy from Philippines: Only One Foothold Left: US Fear Guam Has Fallen”, ST,
12/14/1941
6) “World-Wide War: Balance of Victories and Defeats”, ST, 12/14/1941
7) “Allies to Form a United Front: Pooling Resources of Men and Supplies”, ST, 12/14/1941
8) “The Power of Darkness”-Japan’s sudden and treacherous attack on the United States is one of
the most momentous events in history, ST, 12/14/1941
As can be seen from Table 5, there was substantial initial relief at the outcome of the Munich
Conference ceding the Sudentenland to Germany. It appears the Sunday Times recognized the
seriousness of the progression to war in March 1939, as the United Kingdom and France extended
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guarantees to several countries, including Poland, in the aftermath of Czechoslovakia’s elimination.
At this time, the paper refers to sector-rotation in the markets, towards the heavier “iron and steel
shares.” The Sep. 3, 1939 declaration of war gave rise to favorable (from the British perspective)
economic comparisons with Aug. 1914. French capitulation in June 1940 instituted an analysis of
a prospective invasion, together with expressions of hope regarding continued resistance by French
overseas territories. Key attention was then paid to the critical Battle of Britain over British skies.
On June 22, 1941, Germany’s Operation Barbarossa brought the Soviet Union into World War II
as a British ally, with the paper alluding to an “Ebb and Flow . . . Undercurrent in Our Favor.”
The events on Dec. 7, 1941 focus on the Japanese attack on Naval Station Pearl Harbor and other
Hawaiian military facilities as “one of the most momentous events in history.”
The British stock and bond capital markets serve as a most-illuminating quantitative assessment
of on-going international events. Figure 4 below presents price indices for the British stock market
(in USD and inflation-adjusted terms) as well as the 4% U. K. Consolidated bond over the period
Feb. 1938 – July 1945.
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Figure 4: The figure displays performance of British stock and bond market during the period
between February 1938 and August 1945. The dashed area corresponds to periods crucial for
continuation of local stock and bond market. The areas are numerated as follow (on top): 1-
Munich Accord, 2- British Guarantee to Poland, 3- Britain and France declared war on Germany
4- Beginning of Battle of Britain. On bottom of the figure the key events for WW2 period are
highlighted: 1- Annexation of Austria, 2- German victory in of Battle of France, 3-Beginning of
war between the Soviet Union and Germany 4- United States entered the War, 5- German setbacks
at Stalingrad and El Alamein, 6-Germany’s first major defeat- Stalingrad, 7- D Day: The Allied
invasion of France, 8-Germany surrenders to the allies.
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We believe Figure 4 gives rise to the following conclusions and results: The seemingly bullish
outcome of the Sep. 1938 Munich Conference did not produce a stock-market rally, possibly in
part due to the monthly frequency of our observations. The seven months preceding Oct. 31, 1939
resulted in a decline of 22.2%. The all-time low over this period came on July 31, 1940, following
the end of the Battle of France and following the July 10th beginning of the Battle of Britain. The
index had declined 55.1% from its Feb. 28, 1938 value.
The Battle of Britain is generally considered to have ended on Oct. 31, 1940, by which time
the index had recovered 25.7% from its July 31, 1940 value. The addition of the Soviet Union as
an ally in June 1941 did not appear to have an immediate positive effect on stock-market values,
likely due in part to initial Soviet setbacks, although the market did appreciate 8.5% in July 1941.
Perhaps surprisingly, the addition of the United States, of greater eventual impact on the U. K. in
its influence, in Dec. 1941 failed to post a significant positive return by Jan. 31, 1942.
In early Nov. 1942, British forces were on track to succeed in the second battle of El Alamein
in Egypt, while Anglo-American troops landed in North Africa in Operation Torch. In recounting
those two events at one of his famous wartime speeches, Prime Minister Churchill addressed the
Lord Mayor’s Day luncheon Nov. 9, 1942:
“Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps,
the end of the beginning.”
As can be seen from Figure 4, the British stock market had continued an almost monotonic increase
in value from July 31, 1940: By Nov. 30, 1942, it had increased 95.6%.
By month’s end after V-E Day, May 31, 1945, the British stock market had doubled, representing
an increase of 129.2%, relative to its July 31, 1940 value. The bond market’s behavior was quite
distinct. Although it too declined 50.1% from Feb. 1938 to May 1940, by Aug. 1940 — two months
before the stated end of the Battle of Britain — it increased in value back to 80% of its Feb. 1938
value. Critically, the bond price stayed at that level for the remainder of the time period (through
the end of Aug. 1945). Again, if we interpret that as the (possibly-new) level of bond-market
“normalcy,” the bond market returned to that level very early in the war.
Assuming bond prices reflected free-market operations and not stabilization policies by British
monetary authorities, the behavior of the bond market appears to highlight the role of Battle of
Britain as the point of British maximal existential exposure.
3.7 Raw Returns or World Market-Adjusted Excess Returns?
Before we turn to summarize the results of this section, it is important to opine on whether the
results we report are simply a reflection of U. S. or global markets exhibiting substantial fluctuations
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in prices. Given the substantial pressure under which these four countries labored in this period,
that is a priori unlikely. Nevertheless, to perform this analysis we considered the returns of each of
these four countries, respectively, in excess of our global market return, essentially positing a beta
of unity on the world market portfolio. 14 The results of that analysis are presented graphically in
the figure below (see Figure 5):
14 In the Appendix’s Table A1, we present the composition of a global index portfolio: In the
early 1920s, the portfolio consists of 20 countries; during World War II, there are 31 countries in
the portfolio. The last rebalancing in the 1990s leads to a global portfolio of 34 countries.
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Figure 5: The figure displays cumulative abnormal returns for British, French, Swedish and Polish
stock market during the period between February 1938 and August 1945. The abnormal return is
defined as difference between monthly return of each of these four stock markets and global market
return. The dashed area corresponds to periods crucial for outcome of World War II. The areas
are numerated as follow : 1- Annexation of Austria, 2- Munich Accord, 3- Invasion of Poland by
Germany, 4- Soviet-Finnish war, 5- Norwegian campaign and German victory, 6- German victory
in of Battle of France, 7-Beginning of war between the Soviet Union and Germany, 8- United States
entered the War, 9- German setbacks at Stalingrad and El Alamein, 10-Germany’s first major
defeat- Stalingrad, 11- D Day: The Allied invasion of France, 12-Germany surrenders to the allies.
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The conclusions we glean from this figure are these. For the U. K. and Sweden, it would appear
the results bear out the country-specific nature of stock-market returns: While the country was
under pressure, its stock-market underperformed. As the country’s pressure was relieved — Aug.
1940 for the U. K. and Jan. 1941 for Sweden — its stock market recovered. As previously stated,
there is no empirical evidence of a Sweden 1941 ”Midsummer Crisis.”
For France, there is a crisis in Sep. 1939 with the outbreak of hostilities and at the end of Third
Republic. But arguably the market did not have a sense of what the 1940 armistice would forebode.
Polish stock-market behavior appears to indicate little impact to the April abrogation of the
non-aggression pact, whereas there was some impact to the imminence of 1939 hostilities.
Thus, as was to be expected, the excess returns for the four countries over the period March
1938 – June 1945 exhibit the same sensitivity to prevailing country-specific events as do the raw
returns we presented above.
3.8 Summary
In a free-market economy, the value of the stock-market at any point in time represents the present
values of expected cash flows accruing to stockholders, discounted at the appropriate risk-adjusted
discount rate. In general, of course, these will be impacted by a myriad of political, economic
and financial considerations. In examining four national stock markets before and during World
War II, we posit the ex-ante single-minded focus on the survival of the national body politic as
then constituted, and the maintenance of civil and human rights that permit stockholders to enjoy
the fruits of their investments. Given the events that possessed the continent of Europe from the
establishment of the Nazi regime in March 1933, the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March
1936 and especially the Austrian Anschluss of Feb. 1938, until the declaration of war in Sep. 1939,
we feel this is a reasonable hypothesis to maintain.
1. That said, we attempted to discern whether stock and bond markets were able to anticipate the
potential loss-of-sovereignty “apocalypse” during the Second World War. Any conclusion with
respect to the informational efficiency of capital markets must perforce face the distinction
between ex-ante and ex-post realizations. With respect to the two countries which succumbed
during World War II, Poland and France, it is fair to say their respective stock markets had
no inkling as to the ex-post likelihood and implications of military defeats. Polish capital
markets declined 23.2%, and the French market an almost identical 22.9%, from their Feb.
1938 levels. In the event, ex-post Poland did not return to capital markets for over half a
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century, and both countries suffered considerably before their return to sovereignty.15
2. For the two countries that remained intact, the peak-to-trough decline was 36.3% for Sweden
and 55.1% for the United Kingdom. The trough for both countries does appear to be the
moment of greatest exposure, and somewhat-coincidentally the same chronological date:
(a) For Sweden, the German invasion of next-door Norway
(b) For the United Kingdom, the end of the Battle of France, which left the United Kingdom
and its Commonwealth as the sole Western belligerents
For both countries, the changing fortunes of military engagements subsequently revived their
domestic stock and bond markets.
4 The Global Equity Risk Premium
4.1 Importance of the Global Equity Risk Premium
Lying as it does close to the heart of finance, the computation of the equity risk premium is central
to the profession:16
1. Its impact is pervasive in corporate finance as it is an input in the determination of risk-
adjusted returns critical for valuation purposes
2. It serves a central role in asset pricing, as it is the benchmark against which risky debt and
equity returns are computed
Consequently, Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) sought to address the computation of the global equity
risk premium by considering some 75 years of returns to equity assets throughout the world.
As laid out in our initial assumptions, we believe the computation of such returns cannot ignore
the environment in which they are calculated: Specifically, we believe asset returns represent claims
to purchasing power, and if access to purchasing power is impeded or indeed eliminated, the nominal
returns become meaningless. It is this defect in the JG computations we seek to address.
15 Several correspondents have alluded to the fact there were several historical precedents to
France and Poland being invaded by Germany prior to 1939: France in 1870 and 1914; Poland
through several “partitions.” Respectfully, in so doing these analysts fail to distinguish between the
Bismarckian and Wilhelmine regimes on the one hand, and the nature of the German regime in
1939.
16 The monograph by Mehra (2008) provides detail surveys on estimation and application of
equity risk premiums.
33
4.2 The Value of Financial Assets Amid Property, Civil and Human
Rights
It is perhaps self-evident one requires property rights in order to secure the benefits of financial and
real assets: It is only through such rights societies provide all of their members with guarantees
they can convert their investments into the purchasing power which provides the utility individuals
are maximizing.17 We assume civil and human rights are necessary but not sufficient conditions for
the existence of property rights.
To begin, we note the literature is replete with authors who have correlated economic develop-
ment and property rights.
1. Mauro (1995) addresses this relationship: “Low security of property rights over physical
capital, profits, and patents may reduce incentives and opportunities to invest, innovate, and
obtain foreign technology.”
2. Knack and Keefer (1995) note “[I]nstitutions that protect property rights are crucial to eco-
nomic growth and to investment.” Further, Keefer and Knack (1997) write, “Deficiencies
in the institutional environment may reduce investment and the ability of countries to ab-
sorb technological advances from abroad. Without these advances, countries may grow more
slowly.”
3. De Soto (2000) argues transitional and developing economies have limited success with capi-
talism due to lack of formal property rights for the poor.
4. According to its web site, the Cato Institute is “a public policy research organization . . .
dedicated to the principles of individual liberty, limited government, free markets and peace.”
In its position on “Property Rights, The Key to Economic Development,” it states, “Historical
economic development can only be explained by private property, the rule of law, and other
key institutions.”
5. In economics, the Coase Theorem addresses the importance of well-defined property rights
(though possibly not their initial distribution) to an efficient allocation of capital to invest-
ment. This has led to the conclusion a clear delineation of property rights is an essential
ingredient to market transactions.
6. Pinto, Weymouth and Gourevich (2010) uncover a surprising result, that ”left-leaning gov-
ernments are more likely to be associated with higher stock market capitalization than their
17 With the Lutheran Pastor Martin Niemöller’s famous quote firmly in mind, the adjective “all”
is designed to eliminate selective or sequential arbitrary deprivation of rights.
34
counterparts to the right and center of the political spectrum.” They explain this seemingly
paradoxical result by noting “These results are consistent with recent theories emphasizing an
emergent coalition of workers and owners against managers in favor of greater transparency
and shareholder protection.”
7. Dowell-Jones and Kinley (2011) consider the impact of finance on human rights, exploring
how the Great Recession’s derivatives aspect has adversely impacted employment. Our paper
considers the (reverse) impact of human rights on finance: In the absence of such rights,
finance is meaningless.
Our position is a stronger one: We posit there is no value to an asset unless unrestricted
property rights — and, explicitly, human and civil rights — give its owner the right to legal, free
and unfettered consumption. Thus:
1. In a book review, Kuzner (2012) writes of
“negative freedoms, or ‘freedoms from,’ say, the seizure of property, arbitrary vio-
lence, and so on. Here freedom assumes the form of protection, a set of borders or
frontiers that surround and safeguard the individual.”
2. Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) write explicitly, “Property rights are fundamental:
entrepreneurs will not invest if they expect to be unable to keep the fruits of their investment.”
3. Harold Demsetz (1967), writing in “Toward a Theory of Property Rights”:
“When a transaction is concluded in the marketplace, two bundles of property rights
are exchanged. . . . Economists usually take the bundle of property rights as a datum
[emphasis added] . . ..”
Our perspective is similar, though not identical, and, we argue, consistent: We assert that in
the absence of civil and human rights, property rights cannot exist.
4. Boubakri, El Ghoul and Saffar (2014) provide a quantitative estimate of the existence/absence
of human rights:
“We examine the influence of political rights on the implied cost of equity capital
using a sample of firms from 44 countries. We find that firms’ equity financing costs
are lower when political rights are stronger.”
5. Writing in the narrower context of real estate, Yong Tu and Helen X. H. Bao (2009):
Political instability may weaken investors’ belief in property rights, putting the in-
vestors in fear that part of their investment may be wasted due to poor protection.”
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We consequently take issue with the assertion, in Frey and Waldenström, that “A nation may
disappear but the related financial assets may survive.” Rather, we believe the implication of our
definition of property, civil and human rights is this: In its absence, due to the inability to consume
freely from one’s wealth, the residual value of the equity (and bond) claims is zero, not 25% as
assumed by Jorion and Goetzmann (1999). The remainder of this section is devoted to detailing
the empirical implications of that assumption.
Consider Tables 6 through 8 below. Table 6 presents those countries which have had continuous
equity markets, as we define them, over the period covered by the GFD data we utilize.
Table 7 details the specific circumstances which abolished civil and property rights in different
countries during the 20th century.
Based on Table 7, Table 8 conducts the calculation of equity returns based on our assumption
regarding countries with discontinuous equity markets due to loss of property and/or human rights.
In so doing, we explicitly distinguish between the empirical results of JG approach, and our own,
designated BR, approach.18
The construction of Table 8 required a judgment call as to which countries to include, and
exclude, from this table. We deemed those countries which succumbed internally or externally
to autocratic rule during World War II to be incontrovertible, and hence included in the table.
The sole additional country is then-named Kingdom of Egypt, whose price series ends in 1952
with the Revolution of the Free Officers Movement. In Table 6, we specifically considered military
coup d’etats, primarily in Latin America but also in post-WWII Europe, Africa and Asia. By
examining each, we determined these internal coups were materially different from the external loss
of sovereignty during World War II, and also different from a regime change that abolished capital
markets. We deemed the 1952 change in Egypt to be a change of regime akin to the Nov. 1917
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.
Accordingly, we made the judgment calls that these military coup d’etats did not constitute
events causing an end to their respective national capital markets. That in turn implies our estimate
18 In Appendix A, we include our detailed presentation of two tables:
1. Table A1 contains the Composition of World Index for Countries with Continuity of Human
and Property Rights throughout the period, and identifies for each country its period of
exclusion and return (if any).
2. Table A2 contrasts by presenting the Composition of World Index for Jorion and Goetzmann
(1999) Approach.
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of the equity risk premium is conservative, since inclusion of any additional countries would tend
to lower the risk-premium estimate further.
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Table 6: Performance of Equity Markets with Continuity of Rights
Country Begin Date End Date Mean Median Std. Dev.
Argentina(ARG) 31/01/1939 31/12/1996 20.05 0.00 61.49
Australia (AUS) 31/01/1921 31/12/1996 6.67 4.96 17.65
Brazil(BRA) 30/06/1925 31/12/1996 −19.99 −32.44 31.57
Canada (CAN) 31/01/1921 31/12/1996 6.37 8.54 17.17
Chile (CHL) 31/12/1921 31/12/1996 12.91 0.02 39.09
Columbia (COL) 31/01/1927 31/12/1996 0.23 −3.40 21.84
Spain (ESP) 31/01/1921 31/12/1996 3.74 3.24 18.96
Finland (FIN) 31/01/1921 31/12/1996 7.01 3.22 21.26
Greece (GRE) 31/12/1952 31/12/1996 9.72 −4.89 27.69
India (IND) 31/01/1921 31/12/1996 3.38 0.60 18.90
Ireland (IRL) 31/01/1934 31/12/1996 6.58 4.70 16.44
Israel (ISR) 31/01/1949 31/12/1996 6.73 4.74 26.64
Mexico (MEX) 31/01/1930 31/12/1996 8.85 1.81 30.07
New Zealand (NZ) 31/12/1926 31/12/1996 5.10 6.78 18.20
Pakistan (PAK) 31/07/1960 31/12/1996 3.90 1.71 21.04
Peru (PER) 31/12/1926 31/12/1996 8.76 0.00 44.03
Philippines (PHL) 31/12/1952 31/12/1996 2.30 −5.13 32.53
Portugal (POR) 30/06/1931 31/12/1996 8.01 −0.73 30.05
South Africa (ZAF) 31/01/1921 31/12/1996 6.67 5.46 19.47
Switzerland (SUI) 31/01/1921 31/12/1996 7.91 8.28 16.56
Sweden (SWE) 31/01/1921 31/12/1996 8.06 8.65 17.78
United Kingdom (UK) 31/01/1921 31/12/1996 6.56 8.79 19.15
Uruguay (URY) 31/01/1925 31/12/1996 1.20 −4.07 56.11
United States (USA) 31/01/1921 31/12/1996 7.99 11.01 19.26
Venezuela (VEN) 31/12/1929 31/12/1996 7.64 3.02 25.48
The table presents annual nominal returns denominated in U.S. dollars for 25
countries. In those countries human and property rights were preserved during
examined period. The sample period varies across country and it is defined
by column 2 and 3. The last three columns reports mean, median and annual
volatility. The returns reported in the table are consistent with approach of











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results of Table 8 are particularly instructive as its BR results present the very disparate
results obtained when taking cognizance of human and civil rights. In contrast, the JG results
average over these, ignore their impact, and allow for the post-World War II global recovery and
end-of-period 1990’s peace dividend to improve the overall time-series performance of world equity
markets.
4.3 Construction of Global Equity Indices: Approaches
Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) constructed a value-weighted global equity index using data on
international stock markets’ performance sourced from Morgan Stanley Capital International Per-
spectives (MSCIP) for developed markets and from International Finance Corporation (IFC) for
emerging markets. Due to the lack of reliable data on market capitalization for all examined markets
for the period 1921 – 1996, the authors assigned weights based on gross domestic product (GDP).
The data on GDPs were obtained from Mitchell (1992, 1993, 1995) and converted to U. S. dollars
using annual averages. The Jorion and Goetzmann study shows that the GDP weights are roughly
of the same order of magnitude as the market-value weights implied by capitalization.
The beginning of each decade of the 20th century is marked by rebalancing of portfolios, where
weights are determined by the changed distribution of world GDP. Jorion and Goetzmann argue
that a value-weighted scheme is appropriate for measurement of investor returns when survival is
an issue.
From the perspective of our study, it is very important to discuss how the Jorion and Goetzmann
study dealt with trading interruptions. They considered two kinds of interruptions: A temporary
one, where the stock market eventually reopens before the end of 1996, and a permanent one, with
no information about the continuity of prices across the interruption. In the case of a temporary
break in trading, the return between the last data point before the break and the first data point
after resuming trading is evenly spread out over the time period of the interruption. In the case
of countries such as Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Romania, Jorion and
Goetzmann assumed that a market fell by 75% in the month following a permanent interruption.
They argued that arbitrary selection of a 75% imputed drop was justified by the fact that markets
before their death are characterized by low weight.
In our paper, we refer to Jorion and Goetzmann’s method of constructing a global equity portfolio
as the JG approach. In Table A1, we present the composition of a global index portfolio using the
JG approach. In the early 1920s, the portfolio consists of 20 countries; during World War II, there
are 31 countries in the portfolio. The last rebalancing in the 1990s leads to a global portfolio of 34
countries.
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Our study suggests an alternative approach to constructing a world index portfolio that takes
into account the fact that without human, civil and property rights there is no free market. We
construct a value-weighted global equity index using the same data applied in the JG method. The
country indices and GDPs denominated in U.S. dollars were sourced from GFDatabase. Similar
to Jorion and Goetzmann’s (1999) study, we assigned weights based on GDP. In the case of non-
violation of human, civil and property rights on a country level, ordinary rebalancing takes place
at the beginning of each decade. Any such violation leads to at least one extraordinary rebalancing
of the world portfolio — the value of the affected stock market is assumed to be 0 (investors lose
all capital invested in a particular market), and the country is excluded from the world portfolio up
until basic rights of all residents are restored. At that time, a second rebalancing take place, and
the country again becomes part of the value-weighted world portfolio.
Table 7 presents thirteen country-level events when human, civil and property rights were sig-
nificantly limited or abolished. In all except three cases, markets were added back to the world
portfolio by the mid-1990s. In our paper, we refer to our described method of world index con-
struction as the BR approach. In comparison with the JG approach, it has 24 rebalancings versus
8 for the JG approach, in the period 1921 – 1996. Table 10 presents the country composition of the
BR value-weighted equity portfolio with respect to human, civil and property rights. The first row
reveals the length of time without ordinary and extraordinary rebalancing. In the early 1920s, the
BR portfolio consists of 20 countries; during World War II, the number of countries in the portfolio
ranges from 22 to 25. The number was determined by GFDatabase data availability and German or
Soviet occupations. On average, the world equity portfolio is subject to change every eight months
during World War II. The years 1940 and 1944 are characterized by a particularly high number of
changes to the portfolio. In the case of the JG approach, as little as 3% of the world equity market
was affected by permanent interruption. In the BR approach, as much as 23.1% of the world equity
market was affected by violations of basic rights in the early and mid-1940s. Not surprisingly, there
are significant differences in the performance of both proxies for a global equity index.
4.4 The Global Equity Risk Premium — Contrasting JG and BR Es-
timates
With these results in place, Figure 6 presents a time-series of global non-U. S. and global-with
U. S. estimates of the monthly equity Sharpe Ratio using JG and our own BR estimates.19 In our
estimates, we set the residual value of an equity market to zero in accordance with Table 7. Of
19 As was indeed the case for the JG study, the Sharpe Ratio we compute also ignores the riskfree
rate and is computed as the ratio of Average Monthly Return to Std. Dev. of Monthly Returns.
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the two largest economies to which this applies, the German is set to zero in March 1933, with
the enactment of the Enabling Act; the French is set to zero at the conclusion of the June 1940
Armistice.
Our analysis of failed markets recognizes these events occurred to some fairly substantial markets
— Germany and France. To demonstrate the effect of time in our estimates, we compute the estimate
of the Sharpe Ratio at distinct points, using data available up to that date. Thus, we begin our
estimates in 1931 using the past ten years, and then expand that window until 1996, the date of
the JG results. We present these results with and without the inclusion of the U. S. stock-market
in the results.
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Figure 6: The figures display monthly Sharpe ratios calculated for World index constructed with
(upper figure) and without U.S. stock market (lower figure). Each figure presents estimations for
index constructed in line of Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) (JG approach) and BR approach. The
BR approach for construction World index takes into account the impact of violation of human and
property rights on wealth creation. For given point the Sharpe ratio is calculated from monthly
returns for period between January 1921 and corresponding date. Sharpe ratio is the ratio of
monthly mean to monthly volatility.
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There are several results which highlight the differences between our results and those of JG:
1. Taking the point estimates at face value, we note the importance of our results to the rest-
of-the-world analysis (see lower part of Figure 6): Given the lasting negative results of the
Great Depression, under our BR results, the estimated Sharpe Ratio did not become positive
until 1960, whereas the JG results first became positive as early as 1939.
2. The importance of the U. S. equity market to the world estimate of the equity risk premium is
considerable. When the U. S. is included in the global equity portfolio, the BR Sharpe Ratio
becomes positive as early as 1932, and is 0.16/0.14 − 1 = 14.3% higher than the rest-of-the-
world.
3. Over the twentieth century, the Sharpe reward to risk ratio for U. S. equities is 1−0.12/0.14 =
14.3% lower than the rest-of-the-world. For JG paper it is 1 − 0.1433/0.1740 = 17.6% lower
than the rest-of-the-world.
4. Time diversification has compressed the JG and BR estimates, as equity markets reflected the
generally-positive final outcomes to twentieth-century crises.
Finally, Table 9 conducts a comprehensive comparison of Sharpe-Ratio estimates across several
dimensions: It contrasts the JG paper’s U. S.-specific results with those obtained using GFD data.
It contrasts the JG paper’s results with our implementation of the JG approach, which we assert is
a correct implementation of the analysis using GFD data. It contrasts the JG approach with our
own BR approach. It implements these analyses for the U. S. index, the Global Index, and the
Rest-of-the-World index. It computes arithmetic average returns, annualized volatilities, monthly
Sharpe Ratios, geometric return and end-of-period wealth. It performs all of the above for both the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10: Global Equity Risk Premium Relative to U.S. T-Bills for period 1900-2014
Index Source/Approach Period Mean Std. Dev. Sharpe Ratio Ending Wealth
U.S. Index DMS 2011 paper 1900-2010 7.20% 19.80% 0.364 $21,766
GFD database 1900-2014 7.41% 19.61% 0.378 $31,862
3-month T-bills 1900-2014 3.83% 2.86% $72.16
Global index DMS 2011 paper 1900-2010 5.90% 17.10% N/A N/A
DMS approach 1900-2014 6.68% 17.29% 0.387 $24,064
BR approach 1900-2014 6.26% 16.79% 0.373 $15,864
Global index DMS 2011 paper 1900-2010 5.90% 19.90% N/A N/A
ex-U.S. DMS approach 1900-2014 5.66% 20.59% 0.275 $4,613
BR approach 1900-2014 4.57% 19.08% 0.239 $1,754
The table presents estimation of equity risk premium for global index. The global index consist of follow-
ing countries: Australia, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, United Kingdom and United
States. As proxy of risk free rate we use 90 days time-money rates on New York Stock Exchange Loans un-
til 1920 and 3 month U.S. T-bills after 1920. Each row corresponds to the different definition of index. Ta-
ble reports total returns in U.S. dollars per annum. Following the study by Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton
(2011), the historical equity risk premium is measured by taking the geometric difference between the
equity return and the risk-free return: (1 + Equity rate of return)/(1 + Risk − free return) − 1.
Arithmetic mean and standard deviation of equity premium is calculated for each period. Sharpe ratio is
the ratio of mean to standard deviation of annual equity risk premium. Ending wealth reports the final
value of $1 invested in the beginning 1900 at the end of the sample. Some numbers are taken directly
from study by Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2011), to compare DMS and BR approach. The table
reports two approaches to breaks in trading activity. The so-called DMS approach used in work Dimson,
Marsh, and Staunton (2011). The BR approach estimates performance of equity market only if human
and/or property rights are fully respected.
47
Table 9 gives rise to several conclusions. JG significantly underestimate the volatility of the U. S.
stock market: As is well-known, said vol exceeds 19% — consistent with Ibbotson-Sinquefield results
— but they have it at just over 16%. This is a proportional error of magnitude 19.26/16.19−1 = 19%
and affects subsequent estimates of the monthly Sharpe Ratio. Their is at 0.143, whereas our is at
0.120 for period 1921-1996 and 1921-2014 period.
JG also overestimate the end-of-period wealth for $1 invested in Jan. 1921: Their value is $171.2
whereas ours is $104.41. For period 1921-2014, such investment return $263.92.
Computing the Sharpe Ratio for the global index over the JG period 1921 – 1996, their paper
reports a value of 0.1845. Our replication of their paper yields 0.1734, whereas our methodology
gives rise to 0.16. Their full overstatement is thus 0.185/0.16− 1 = 15.63%. This has particularly-
dramatic implications at the end-of-wealth levels: Their paper reports $211.2, our implementation of
their paper is $155.38, and our approach gives $107.79. The full overstatement here is 211.2/107.79−
1 = 95.9%.
The contrast of the BR approach with JG approach for periods 1921 – 1996 and 1921 – 2014
leads to an overstatement 155.38/107.79− 1 = 44% and 454.21/315.07− 1 = 44%, respectively. In
the period 1996 – 2014 there is no difference between the two approaches, as none of the examined
markets experiences limitation of property, civil and human rights.
These issues are compounded when one addresses the rest-of-the-world index. Their Sharpe-
Ratio overstatement is on the order of 0.174/0.14 − 1 = 24.29% and the wealth-ratio excess is
146.2/46.85− 1 = 212%.
In addition to the contrast with JG, we also compare our results with Dimson, Marsh and
Staunton (DMS, 2008 and 2011). In so doing, our sample consists of the total return indices for
Australia (since 1900), France (1900), Finland (1929), Germany (1900), Italy (1929), Japan (1920),
Sweden (1929), United Kingdom (1900) and United States (1900). Whereas the DMS study covers
19 countries over the period 1900 – 2010, the countries from our sample represent 87% of world
capitalization in 1900. Our sample is limited to the countries whose returns are included in the
GFD database over the sufficiently-long period of time.
In observing the results for Table 10, we can conclude the adjustment for critical events does
give rise to a quantitatively and qualitatively distinct outcome. With respect to U. S. data, the
GFD database we utilize results in a Sharpe Ratio of 0.378, which is slightly higher than the 0.364
reported by DMS. In contrast, for the Global index ex-U. S., our results report Sharpe Ratios lower
by 13% from their DMS counterparts
Thus, the consequences of our analysis, and their quantitative and qualitative distinction from
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those of JG and DMS, result from taking full cognizance of the events which occurred to stock
markets and their investors primarily in Europe in the late ’30’s.
5 Conclusions
This paper sought to examine two major strands of literature, related but different.
The first addressed the performance of stock and bond markets in the face of national existential
threats, with the potential of wiping out the entire value of the investment. Such can arise from
external threats — such as invasion by a foe — or a domestic threat to a free-market economy,
such as would be presented by a change-of-regime to command-and-control. In this respect, the
experience of the Polish and French markets may have been learning experiences for the successive
U. K. and Swedish markets.
To the perennial question, “How well do markets assess such risks?,” the Polish and French
markets, which succumbed to the external threat, the answer would have to be, “Not well.” The
answer appears more clear when it came later to markets that were able to maintain their continuity,
such as the British and Swedish markets. With respect to the first two, our analysis shows those
stock markets did not predict their own closures. In this regard, our findings are in contrast to the
graphical representation (their Fig. 2) in Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) which appears to suggest
a monotonic decline up to their self-described “permanent closure.” Subsequently, it appears the
British and Swedish markets did recognize the point of supreme risk and the subsequent recovery.
The second strand of the literature deals with the empirical estimation of the equity Sharpe
Ratio, as exemplified most strongly in Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) and to some extent in Dimson,
Marsh and Staunton (2008).
While we feel we corrected some erroneous computations the first two authors reported, there
is a far-more fundamental reality of which we believe neither paper took proper cognizance: The
absence of human and civil rights on the ability to enjoy the fruits of capital (and real) markets.
Qualitatively correcting this gave rise to substantially lower Sharpe Ratio, especially when focused
on the non-U. S. portion of the global portfolio. It is crucial to correct this error, as property, civil
and human rights are fundamental to the purchasing-power component of free markets.
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ARG X X X X X X X X
AUS X X X X X X X X
AUT X X X X X X X X
BEL X X X X X X X X
BRA X X X X X X X X
CAN X X X X X X X X
CHL X X X X X X X X
COL X X X X X X X X
CZE X X X X X X X X
DNK X X X X X X X X
EGY X X X X X X X X
ESP X X X X X X X X
FIN X X X X X X X X
FRA X X X X X X X X
GER X X X X X X X X
GRE X X X X X X X X
HUN X X X X X X X X
IND X X X X X X X X
IRL X X X X X X X X
ISR X X X X X X X X
ITA X X X X X X X X
JPN X X X X X X X X
MEX X X X X X X X X
NED X X X X X X X X
NOR X X X X X X X X
NZ X X X X X X X X
PAK X X X X X X X X
PER X X X X X X X X
PHI X X X X X X X X
POL X X X X X X X X
POR X X X X X X X X
SUI X X X X X X X X
SWE X X X X X X X X
UK X X X X X X X X
URY X X X X X X X X
USA X X X X X X X X
VEN X X X X X X X X
ZAF X X X X X X X X
The table display composition of World index constructed using Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) method. In
order to minimize rebalancing, Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) adopted a portfolio value weighted approach.
The weights are set by GDP weights at the beginning of each decade. Each row indicate countries included
in World index (by X) and countries excluded from World index (by X). The approach assumes that in
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